Most of us have been taught that a republic is defined by representative government and that democracy is direct rule by the people. Unfortunately, this distinction is off the mark. The consequence of this misunderstanding is that “we the people” have accepted governing principles that are democratic to the detriment of the Republic.
The source of this misunderstanding actually comes from Federalist #10. What gets lost is that Madison is actually making the argument that a larger republic is better than a small republic because a smaller percentage of representatives would be chosen from a larger pool of potential candidates. Going into the Constitutional Convention, Madison was enamored with Hume’s essay “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth”.[1] Madison referred to the concept as “successive filtration”.[2] He wrote in Federalist #10 that
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.[3]
The word “scheme” is important. He is referring to “successive filtration”, and it was prominent in the original Virginia Plan. However, it was largely shot down in the Philadelphia Convention. The only remnant of Madison’s scheme was state legislature appointments of Senators – which, of course, was destroyed by the 17th amendment.
What constitutes a republic
It was Aristotle who initially defined what constituted a republic and what constituted a democracy. He defined three spectrums of “good” and “bad” forms of government based upon how many rule (one, some, or many).[4] A republic and a democracy are opposite ends of the “rule by the many” spectrum. He referred to what we call a republic as “the best”. Democracy is the worst form of rule by many. It has nothing to do with direct or indirect rule.
The opposite ends of Aristotle’s spectrums are better understood in a larger context by describing “good” government as securing that which the people need and “bad” government as enabling that which those in power want – whether those who rule are one, some, or many.
The cornerstone of a republic
In Politics, Aristotle provides three case studies of “good” governments of his time. In so doing, he refines his view of what constitutes “good” government and describes techniques for how to design a republic. Although a republic enables rule by the many, it incorporates a combination of democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic principles. As Aristotle put it, the distinction between a republic and a democracy is the nature of those who rule. Democracy is when the majority is the poor – that is, the envious. The underlying principle is that a republic enables the three social classes to check the power of each other. Aristotle’s analysis provides a specific example that leads us to a more general republican principle – restraining passions by balancing power.
Our modern definitions of rich, poor, and middle class by “the wallet” totally miss Aristotle’s point of the distinction between the classes. He defined the classes by envy and greed, not their respective wealth – but instead their wealth of character. His poor are envious; the rich are greedy; and “the middle” is neither. As a result, the middle rules best because it is not prone to these specific passions. He understood that the greedy would centralize wealth to themselves if they ruled; the poor would punish “the haves” if they ruled. The middle would do neither, and further they would defend the poor from (the power of) the rich and the rich from the numbers of the poor. He further saw that the middle would not shrink from duty, where both the rich and poor would be prone to do so.
The American Constitution
The framers knew that republics were more stable than democracies, but even republics had failed throughout history. Whereas Aristotle emphasized greed and envy, the founders understood that passions in general led to poor decision making. Furthermore, passions are dynamic, not static. Even the “middle” can be swayed by passions. The challenge was how to design an enduring republic. This is why the framers themselves did not view the Constitution as a perfect document that provided an ironclad guarantee of a good republic. Ben Franklin probably captured the overall sentiment of those who signed it in his closing speech at the Constitutional Convention.[5] He further quipped “a republic, madam, if you can keep it” when Mrs. Elizabeth Powell asked him what form of government the framers had designed.[6] John Adams famously stated that an immoral people would “break the strongest Cords of our Constitution as a Whale goes through a Net”.[7]
A precise definition of a republic, in general
At this point, we need to pause to draw a distinction between what a republic is, and what constitutes a republic. Aristotle correctly and directly identified the cornerstone of a republic – the constitution of society; however, he only indirectly defined what a republic is. The precise definition of a republic is rule by the many that secures what the people need.
A precise definition for a democracy, then, is rule by the many that seeks what the people want – because the many are in power. Therefore, a republic heeds the trope, “be careful what you wish for”. A democracy does not heed it. This is why Madison warned in Federalist 10 that
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.[8]
Take note of the phrase “reducing mankind to perfect equality”. Madison is not only pinpointing the flaw in pure democracy. It is a flaw common to the modern welfare state and socialism.[9] DeTocqueville foresaw the modern welfare state[10] and its flaws. Hayek witnessed the flaws in socialism first hand.[11]
Passions in general
The framers of the Constitution recognized, as did Aristotle, that no design of a government can resist the force of a determined people driven by passion. This is human nature that we can see in our personal finances. Sound financial advice tells us to divide our budget into needs, wants, and savings. If we give into our wants and spend beyond our means, we go bankrupt. Our budgetary challenge is to procure our needs and enough of our wants without blowing out the budget. The challenge to stability in the design of a government is to ensure the needs of the people while satisfying enough of the wants to restrain passions. This cohesion is like the bonds among molecules. Given enough energy (passion), the bonds can be broken.
Beyond Aristotle – establishing republican principles
Aristotle had identified a common sense of justice, no profit from office, and rotation of office as effective techniques to check power. These laid the foundation for the founders’ republican principles.
Time had not stood still since Aristotle. The framers were also inspired by Cicero and the Roman Republic. The enlightenment introduced a multitude of new ideas. First, the writings of John Locke and others, inspired by the Glorious Revolution, introduced the concept of natural rights. Natural rights provided a framework which could effectively check the power of those who govern (the representatives). This was embraced by the founders as an additional republican principle.
Federalism is a technique that sets up a tug-of-war to balance the power between two levels of government vertically. It can be applied more generally to multiple levels of government – a process referred to as recursion. Montesquieu and Hume had discussed federalism. Montesquieu championed loosely-coupled, bottom-up confederation; Hume favored a top-down, more tightly coupled design.[12] These two points of view were well-represented by the Anti-federalists and the Federalists, respectively. Federalism provides another, perhaps even stronger, check on passions and power. The founding generation in general preferred Montesquieu’s view and was the basis for the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution was a shift toward Hume. Madison’s “best and brightest” argument in Federalist 10 reflects Hume’s theory that selecting from a larger pool of talent will yield a better result. However, the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 show that Hume did not win completely. In fact, it has been noted that the founding generation felt so strongly about federalism that the label of Anti-federalist was akin to calling someone “anti-democratic” today.[13]
Another effective technique to balance power and restrain passions is the use of a bicameral governing body. With its roots in the Roman Republic, the British system evolved into a bicameral government that reflected the classes in society – the House of Lords and the House of Commons. American government had evolved from the bottom-up with Montesquieu’s version of federalism. Within the states, the bicameral heritage of the British system was modified to work within a classless society to support disparate perspectives. These three republican principles set up even tighter cohesive bonds than the three previous principles.
The classless society is a uniquely American contribution to governance. Whereas Aristotle had embraced the notion of three distinct classes, Americans rejected them. (This is not to ignore the institution of slavery. Most of the framers recognized the hypocrisy of a system of liberty with slavery, but they were unable to overcome the heritage. Ben Franklin, in particular, was vocal about it.) Slavery aside, their vision was a society where an individual was not locked into being either rich or poor. Everyone could gain or lose a fortune without impediment from the system. The expectation was that the public at large would be ambitious without greed and focus on their own fortunes instead of others so as to avoid general envy. But, how does a bicameral system map to a classless society where greed and envy are marginalized?
If we break the bonds of social classes, we are left with a theoretic distribution of social perspectives. The easiest way to see this is the Meyers-Briggs dichotomy of extraversion and introversion.[14] In general, extraverts will want to be “where the action is”. They will naturally congregate to high-density population centers. They will have similar perspectives because they share a common environment. On the other hand, introverts will just want to be left alone. They will naturally gravitate to less dense populated locations. This smaller part of society has diverse perspectives that naturally dampen passions that get energized in high-density population centers. There is a natural bimodal distribution of social perspectives. This is just one such naturally bimodal distributions within society. Another one we might use is to consider the two dynamic elements of an economy, production and consumption. The strength of the republic will be enhanced by a bimodal view that gives voice to disparate opinions without creating chaos.
Figure 1 Example of a bimodal distribution
The bimodal distribution of perspectives sets up a natural dichotomy[15] that democracies fail to address. Even a bicameral democracy will apportion the two houses by population (Reynolds v Simms). On the other hand, a republic will take advantage of the bimodal distribution to diffuse passions. The American republican template set up one house to be apportioned by population and the other by jurisdictional boundary. This is why the US House is apportioned by population and the Senate is comprised of two from each state. Likewise, the states with bicameral systems used to apportion the House by population and (in general) the Senate by county. More on this later.
The final republican principle is that if “the many” will rule, they must know how. The logical conclusion to this is that an education system that teaches the governing principles of a republic are of paramount importance to ensure the republic endures generational turns. The founding generation universally recognized the overriding importance of this principle. It is human nature to believe in pure democratic principles as “fair”, but this seductive tendency must be tempered with value of restraining passions via republican, not democratic principles. Recognizing that Montesquieu’s version of federalism provided the tightest bond within the republican framework, they gave oversight of education to the states, not the national government. They recognized the danger of a national government encouraging acceptance of increasing centralized power.
Republican principles in the original Constitution
Here are the republican principles presented in this article. The first three and the last one were identified originally by Aristotle. The founders derived the other four from intervening works and their own experiences in Colonial America.
- Common sense of justice: the law must enforce the equity among individuals. To do otherwise fractures society into privileged groups. Common terms associated with this are “rule of law” & “equality before the law”.
- No profit from office: nothing is more deadly to a republic than “profit from office”.
- Rotation of office: The surest way to reduce profit from office is to only allow individuals to rule for a limited time.
- Natural rights: in addition to the writings of Locke and other Enlightenment authors, the Magna Carta and the British Bill of Rights established that persons could have rights not derived from government.
- Classless society: this is the heart of a republic. It emphasizes the size of the “middle”. It is the realization that the best rule comes from those who are neither greedy nor envious. This is why Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution forbids nobility.
- Federalism provides the tightest web of checks & balances
- Restraining passions by balancing power: Bicameral governing bodies manage a dichotomy that results from a bimodal distribution of perspectives.
- Education promoting these republican principles: if “the best” are to continue to rule, society must continue to nurture citizens who are neither greedy nor envious, and promote the principles that perpetuate that environment.
The Constitution itself did not adhere completely to the founding generation’s republican principles.
- Montesquieu’s federalism gave way to Hume’s view, per the nationalists’ (federalists’)
- Rotation of office was left on the “cutting room floor” on 12 Jun 1787 when the Convention unanimously approved Charles Pinckney’s motion to eliminate it – and the recall provision – from the fourth resolution of the Virginia Plan.[16]
- The Convention debated extensively about how much and from what source the legislature would be paid; however, in the end, the door was opened for government officials to profit from office by setting their own compensation.[17] The morality of the officials was the only check on this principle. One of Madison’s original 12 amendments for the Bill of Rights was an attempt to throttle the issue. It became the 27th[18] We have yet to see much benefit since its passage in 1992.
When we measure the Constitution against these principles, we can see why there was so much resistance to the Constitution in 1788. It actually weakened certain aspects of the Republic as designed in the Articles of Confederation. On the other hand, it could also be argued that it strengthened other of the republican principles:
- It enhanced the common sense of justice by creating a uniform set of laws.
- It enhanced the republic with a bicameral governing body.
- Although still leaving education to the states, there was now an additional focus on the importance of civics education. This was mainly ancillary to the Constitution.
- With the Bill of Rights, it confirmed the natural rights of citizens.
- It was a mixed bag on the classless society. On one hand, it put a fork into an aristocracy. On the other hand, it kept slavery alive – for at least 20 years.
Damages to the Republic over time
If the Constitution weakened some republican principles that existed in the Articles of Confederation, successive generations have both strengthened and weakened the Republic under the Constitution.
There can be no doubt that the abolition of slavery after the Civil War enhanced the principles of classless society and a common sense of justice. It should be obvious that the enhancement was not complete. We still struggle to get this right to this very day, but all of the positive moves to fairness have enhanced the Republic.
The structure of the government itself has mostly been damaged by impacting the bicameral governing bodies at both the national and state levels. In both cases, the damage has been done to the Senate. The foundation of the bicameral system of the US Republic has long held that the House represents the people. On the other hand, the Senate is supposed to provide the bimodal perspective that ensures a “republican form of government” that ensures the best chance of achieving the abstract theory of what a republic is.
The 17th Amendment severely damaged the Republic by taking away the perspective of State legislators. Even worse, without term limits (rotation of office) and a poorly educated electorate, Senators are not held accountable by anyone. Once elected, name recognition all but ensures reelection.
At the state level, the Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v Sims, dictated that the States had to apportion the Senate by population. Prior to the ruling, states generally apportioned the Senate by county. This provided a bimodal perspective where rural areas had equity in the Senate. In the ruling, the Court ignored the guarantee in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution that the States were to have a republican form of government. It substituted the democratic “one man, one vote” principle where the republican bicameral principle had existed. This has had dramatically negative effects in a number of states where the people insist upon what they want instead of securing what they need.
But the most damage to the Republic has not been done by amendment or Supreme Court decision, which arguably “followed the process” of the Constitution. The most damage done to the Republic has been the result of removing civics training and history from the curricula of the schools. Without these essential topics, successive generations are not prepared to continue the Republic. We should take a very critical look at the Department of Education. One of the manifestations of the poor educational system is that the Bill of Rights themselves are under attack.
Summary
The difference between a republic and a democracy is dramatic. A republic enables the people to secure their needs. A democracy gives the people what they want – always to disastrous effect. Republics are not perfect, but they give a superior result because they tend to needs instead of desires.
The challenge in designing a republic is to design a cohesive governing system that can resist the normal “mood swings” of the passions of a population that is neither envious nor greedy. The building block of any republic is setting up proper dichotomies that mimic Newton’s Third Law of Physics in governance. Passions that get too strong will always break the cohesive bonds of any republican form of government.
The best that can be done is to make the bonds as strong as possible and to educate the public to resist their passions and use their reason. Our current educational system is a complete failure on this score.
To a degree, we are the victims of the success of the American Republic. The founders, and subsequent generations, had hoped that by their reason and sacrifices they could enable us, their “posterity”, to pursue our passions. That has happened. Unfortunately, the technology and time limitations of the modern world encourage us to fall prey to what social psychologists call automatic influences.[19] These influences leave us prone to unscrupulous individuals – some of whom want to take the Republic from us.
[1] “Online Library of Liberty.” No. 70: David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” (1777) – Online Library of Liberty. Accessed March 21, 2019. http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/oll-reader-70.
[2] Farrand. 13 May 1787.
[3] https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
[4] In Political Vertigo, I translate Aristotle’s words as congruent and incongruent because the terms are used in reference to the institution of government and the purpose of any institution is static. The terms could also be translated as convergent and divergent in a dynamic context. In the context of this article, it gets the point across to just use “good” and “bad”.
[5] http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/pop_finalspeech.html
[6] http://friendsoffranklin.org/?p=328
[7] https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-3102
[8] http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
[9] F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (George Rutledge & Sons, 1944) pp 113-114
[10] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Stephen D. Grant (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 2000), 304–308.
[11] F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (George Rutledge & Sons, 1944) pp 3,113-114
[12] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/
[13] George H. Smith and Wendy McIlroy, The Federalist Papers, Audible (unabridged) (Nashville,
TN: Carmichael & Carmichael, 1986).
[14] http://16-personality-types.com/mbti-four-dichotomies/
[15] tug-of-war
[16] Farrand 2 Jun 1787
[17] Ibid.
[18] https://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_Am27.html
[19] Robert B. Cialdini, Influence Science and Practice (Pearson Education 2001) pg. 11
