What is the difference between a democracy and a republic? Americans today have gotten sloppy by referring to them as synonyms. They are definitely not, and the distinction is very important. As James Madison warned in Federalists #10
Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.[1]
In other words, democracies do nothing to guarantee liberty or safety. Republics are not perfect, but they are superior. To understand why, we need to understand what the difference is. In The Road to Americanism, I derive definitions and explain the differences. We’ll look more specifically at the source of confusion and how it should be corrected.
Students have been taught in United States’ civics classes for a century that whereas democracy is direct involvement of the citizens, a republic is “representative government”. This is flat out wrong. A representative democracy is still a democracy and is prone to the same turbulence as a direct democracy. The origin for this can be seen in Madison’s Federalist No. 10
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.[2] (italics mine)
Unfortunately, the usual interpretation of Madison’s words misses some key points about what Madison was really saying in Federalist No. 10. First, the phrase above, “scheme of representation”, is interpreted differently today from the way Madison intended it. Today, the public expects that representatives will directly reflect our wants – not our needs.
Madison is referring to an scheme of representation that he thought would select the best representatives of the people (those who would address needs first), not the most popular representatives. That is, today, we assume the “scheme” is popular election for all public offices. That is the hallmark of pure democracy, and earlier generations of Americans would not have made that assumption. They understood that such a scheme could unleash passions that cause instability. Madison entered the Constitutional Convention supporting David Hume’s scheme of ‘filtration’.[3] In the Federalist Papers, he was defending a completely different scheme of representation from his own “successive filtration”, but the principles were not purely democratic.
There is general acceptance within the public discourse today that we are a democracy as opposed to a republic. This ignores Madison’s direct warning at the start of this article. Overall, Federalist No. 10 addresses the political realities of passions and interests of factions. After arguing that factions cannot be eliminated without destroying liberty, he lays out that Aristotle’s basic view of a republic only checks passions when factions are in the minority.[4] The framers wanted to address “tyranny of the majority”, where a faction comprises a majority.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle,[5] which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.[6] To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.[7] (italics mine)
Madison is not saying that representation is the sole determinate between a republic and a democracy. The first sentence that refers to popular government is describing a democracy. The next (and last) sentence is describing the framers attempt to create an enduring republic that will resist degenerating to democracy.
Overall he is making the argument that 1) selection of fewer legislators from a larger pool of potential legislators enables better chances of selecting representatives who will make reasoned, dispassionate decisions – and that 2) a larger ratio of representatives to those represented enables a government to cover a larger area. This is the basis for Hume’s theory of filtration that Madison had embraced. Madison’s “successive filtration” was mostly defeated in the Convention, but he is embracing the Convention’s design that retained the philosophy with selection of Senators by State Legislatures (which was destroyed by the 17th amendment). In context, Federalist No. 10 argues that a larger republic offers a better chance of success than earlier, smaller republics because the ratio of fewer representatives can be selected from a larger pool. He is also making the point that the United States is so large that it dictates a representative form of government – hopefully, implementing a republic. In the process, Madison is explaining how the framers sought to ensure that Aristotle’s “best” form of government as described in Politics could become a reality within the nascent American society. The goal was to diffuse passion and let reason prevail.
What a republic really is requires understanding the abstract concept laid out by Aristotle over two millennia ago. In short, a republic is a form of government that enables the middle class to rule.[8] The key component to this definition is that what defines the middle class has nothing to do with monetary wealth.[9]
Within society, there have always been the poor and the rich. Aristotle chronicled that as societies flourished a third, middle class grew.[10] Unlike our view today where these classes are defined by an artificial number based upon wealth, Aristotle’s categorization was based upon attitude.[11] The poor defined themselves by being envious. The rich were defined by greed. The middle class was neither greedy nor envious. As such, they would defend the poor from the power of the rich. In so doing, they ensure personal security of the poor. Conversely, they would defend the rich from the numbers of the poor; thus, ensuring the rights of property. Therefore, the “best” form of government is one where the middle class rules. That is what Aristotle called the “best”. We call it a republic.
There is much more that can be extrapolated to understand the true nature of a republic.
The key observation that should be made is that both the poor and rich have “tunnel vision”. They are solely focused on their own aspirations. All their decisions will be slanted toward their personal benefit. In other words, they only consider one perspective. On the other hand, the middle class will make better decisions because they inherently consider multiple perspectives and value the common good rather than their own interests. That is what makes a republic “the best” form of government. Aristotle really only enumerates three perspectives (rich, middle, poor), but there is no reason to assume such a restriction in the general composition of a real republic.
On the other hand, we know that democracy is simply rule of the majority. If the majority rises above pure self-interest and considers other perspectives, it functions essentially as a republic. That is the situation where Aristotle’s middle class is the majority. However, history has shown that if this situation has ever existed, it has only existed for a short time. In general, the majority is almost always comprised of the “poor”. The framers were very clear on the understanding of the failures of this republican principle (singular). The British world had developed republican principles (plural) that had demonstrated better results because they restrained passions in governance. Aristotle actually identified a number of the principles in his discussions of the examples of governments that were considered good.
Aristotle describes the situation in a democracy is that the middle class is not large enough to buffer the enmity between rich and poor. Since the middle class is too weak to defend the rich from the numbers of the poor, democracy is rule by the poor – who are the majority. The rights of property become insecure because of the poor’s envy. With no security in one’s property, personal security becomes a casualty shortly thereafter.
But we can extrapolate more interests than just those of three classes. We could deduce that each faction of society has an interest. This interest is based upon a perspective. The more perspectives that are considered in the decision-making process (governance), the better the ultimate decision will be because no one interest is completely slighted. Perfection is impossible, but “close enough” is the “best government”.
[1] http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
[2] Federalist 10.
[3] Farrand. Vol. 1. pg. 51.
“Online Library of Liberty.” No. 70: David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” (1777) – Online Library of Liberty. Accessed March 21, 2019. http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/oll-reader-70.
[4] which is Aristotle’s rule by “the middle” – “the best”
[5] the republican principle in this quote refers to Aristotle’s basic view of the constitution of a republic being comprised of a dominant “middle class”
[6] Madison is describing the failure of democracy.
[7] Federalist 10. The last sentence is referring to setting up an enduring republic that will resist degenerating into a democracy.
[8]http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=4:section=1297b&highlight=middle%2Cdemocracies
[9]http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=4:section=1297a&highlight=democracies%2Cmiddle
[10]http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=4:section=1297b&highlight=middle%2Cdemocracies
[11]http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=2:section=1265b&highlight=republic;
